In this work we introduce a model of default contagion that combines the approaches of Eisenberg-Noe interbank networks and dynamic mean field interactions. The proposed contagion mechanism provides an endogenous rule for early defaults in a network of financial institutions. The main result is to demonstrate a mean field interaction that can be found as the limit of the finite bank system generated from a finite Eisenberg-Noe style network. In this way, we connect two previously disparate frameworks for systemic risk, and in turn we provide a bridge for exploiting recent advances in mean field analysis when modelling systemic risk. The mean field limit is shown to be well-posed and is identified as a certain conditional McKean-Vlasov type problem that respects the original network topology under suitable assumptions. other banks to default, thus spreading the original shock further throughout the financial system. Such an event is denoted "default contagion" as the contagion is via default events. (ii) Liquidity contagion occurs if the illiquidity of one bank or institution (as measured by, e.g., the leverage ratio) causes other banks to also become illiquid. This occurs through, e.g., a fire sale of assets; the liquidation of assets causes the prices fall, this harms the leverage ratio of all other institutions via mark-to-market accounting thus causing further liquidations. This has been studied in Cifuentes et al. [2005], Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Feinstein [2020].
Introduction
More than a decade after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the threat of contagious defaults throughout the global financial system in 2008, systemic risk is still of vital importance to study. Systemic risk is the risk of financial contagion, i.e., when the failure of one institution spreads to others due to interlinkages in balance sheets both direct (e.g., via obligations) or indirect (e.g., via overlapping portfolios). The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the magnitude of the costs that systemic crises produce; this necessitates the design of models to consider stress testing of financial institutions to improve regulation and mitigate the worst effects of a crisis.
In this work, we aim to bridge the divide between two, currently unrelated, modeling techniques for financial contagion. That is, we will connect the Eisenberg-Noe network approach popularized by Eisenberg and Noe [2001] to the more recent mean field approaches of systemic risk. As the goal of this paper is primarily to highlight the overlapping notions between those works, and demonstrate that the network models in fact converge to the mean field limit, we will focus on simple, but realistic, financial settings that illustrate this point.
Briefly, there are two main contagion channels for systemic risk: (i) default contagion and (ii) liquidity contagion.
(i) Default contagion occurs if the failure of one bank or institution to repay its debts in full causes other banks to default triggering a chain reaction of failing banks. This occurs through, e.g., a network of interbank obligations as studied in the seminal works of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] , Rogers and Veraart [2013] in a static, network-based setting. More specifically, in those works, the default of a bank causes direct impacts to the balance sheets of other banks in the financial system. This loss of capital (potentially) causes networks determine the defaulting set of banks by finding exactly those institutions who do not pay off their obligations in full when the network clears. A fundamental concept for such models is the stylized banking balance sheet. By and large, these models provide a static snapshot of the health of the financial system, though dynamics have begun to be included in select network models; more details on these models will be provided herein.
The Eisenberg-Noe model. To fix the concepts, we will present first the Eisenberg-Noe clearing payment system from the seminal work Eisenberg and Noe [2001] . In short, consider n banks that make up the financial system, each with some initial endowment x i ≥ 0 for firm i.
Each firm additionally has liabilities to other institutions denoted by the total liabilitiesp i ≥ 0 for firm i and the relative obligations between two firms π ij is given by the proportion of the total liabilities of firm i owed to j. The realised payments p ∈ R n that each firm makes is obtained by the fixed point equation
where a ∧ b := (min(a 1 , b 1 ), . . . , min(a n , b n )) denotes the lattice minimum in the usual way. One of the key strengths of this model is in its relation to a simple balance sheet that can be calibrated to data, as undertaken in, e.g., Upper and Worms [2004] , Mastromatteo et al. [2012] , Anand et al. [2015] , Gandy and Veraart [2016] using, e.g., data from the European Banking Authority.
Analysis of (2.1). The Eisenberg-Noe model for clearing payments inherently codifies three key financial constructs:
(i) priority of debt over equity: a firm must first pay off its debts in full before it accumulates any equity;
(ii) limited liabilities: no firm pays more than their contractual obligations; and (iii) pro-rata repayment: there is no seniority structure of debt.
This last assumption, on pro-rata repayment, has been weakened to allow for varying seniority structures and prioritized repayment in, e.g., Elsinger [2009] , Feinstein [2019] . A fourth assumption is also considered in the Eisenberg-Noe model, though it is relaxed in many subsequent works. That is, (iv) full recovery in default: a firm has no costs associated with defaulting on its obligations.
This was studied in Rogers and Veraart [2013] , Glasserman and Young [2015] , Weber and Weske [2017] as a strict extension of the Eisenberg-Noe model. The model of Gai and Kapadia [2010] can also be viewed as an extension (2.1) with 0 recovery in default, i.e., no payment is made in case of default. Given that these financial constructs are all rules that define the value of assets and liabilities, the Eisenberg-Noe model and its extensions are often described as a balance sheet description of the financial system. Mathematically, as the clearing payment problem inherent to the Eisenberg-Noe model is a fixed point equation (2.1), the question of existence and uniqueness is of the paramount importance. Under the first three financial constructs, and thus allowing for bankruptcy costs, there exists a lattice of clearing payments via the application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. In particular, this implies that there exists a greatest clearing payment vector; such a payment scheme would always be chosen as all institutions in the system have the greatest possible equity under this scheme, i.e., it is the Nash equilibrium of all clearing payments. In addition, if we introduce the fourth financial construct (full recovery of assets) then, under very simple assumptions (e.g., all banks in the system hold some initial endowment), the clearing payment is unique. In addition, in the Eisenberg-Noe setting, the sensitivity of the clearing payments to changes in the system parameters has been studied in Liu and Staum [2010] for the endowments and for consideration of the relative liabilities.
The fictitious default algorithm, first presented in Eisenberg and Noe [2001] , is used to efficiently find the greatest clearing solution. Briefly, this algorithm initially assumes no banks are in default and determines the clearing payments under such an assumption. If any banks default in that scenario then in the greatest clearing solution they must also be in default. Fixing only those banks as defaulting, a new clearing payment is computed under such a setting. This process of checking for defaults and determining new clearing payments under fixed set of insolvent banks is repeated until there are no new defaults. As the Eisenberg-Noe model consists of finite number n of banks, this process is guaranteed to converge in at most n iterations. Though this algorithm is efficient, and the underlying problem is mathematically well-structured, analytical results are typically not feasible to provide.
Random graph approach. In order to obtain some analytical results in this network framework, prior works consider passing to the n → ∞ limit of banks in the system. These network asymptotics are considered in settings in which the interbank liabilities are described by a random graph. The simplest random graph model is the Erdös-Rényi network in which a fixed valued connection is made between any two banks based on a fixed probability. In many of these asymptotic studies the model of Gai and Kapadia [2010] is utilised, i.e., there is no recovery in case of default. Such an all-or-nothing payment setting leads to tractable formulae for the probability of defaults in the graph. We refer to Hurd [2016] , and references therein, for a detailed survey of this random graph approach.
The analytical results from this random graph approach allow for further considerations of system stability as well. For the finite network setting, systemic risk measures to determine acceptable capital requirements for the entire financial system have been proposed in, e.g., Chen et al. [2013] , Kromer et al. [2016] , Feinstein et al. [2017] , Biagini et al. [2019b] , but these objects require Monte Carlo simulation for any computation. In contrast, Amini et al. [ , 2012 , , Detering et al. [2019] are able to define a resiliency metric and determine capital requirements for banks to make the system acceptable to regulators. This asymptotic framework thus provides for simple comparative statics.
Dynamic network models of default contagion. Considerations given thus far are solely in a static setting. However, banking balance sheets are highly dynamic and subject to fluctuations due to, e.g., market movements. Indeed the conclusion of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] gives a discussion of how to include multiple clearing dates and time dynamics, which has been studied in Capponi and Chen [2015] , Ferrara et al. [2016] . Additionally, Kusnetsov and Veraart [2018] considers a similar approach to a financial model with multiple maturities.
As Capponi and Chen [2015] presented in a discrete time setting: A firm is liquid and solvent at some time t if it has positive equity and has not previously been insolvent. Due to the assumptions inherent in (2.1), if a firm is liquid then it must pay in full. A firm is illiquid and solvent at some time t if it has negative cash account, but is able to obtain a loan to cover its deficits, and has not previously been insolvent. As will be described in this work, and as undertaken in Banerjee et al. [2018] , Sonin and Sonin [2017] , these loans will take the form of rolling forward unpaid debts from solvent firms to their obligees. This is the key distinction that cannot exist in the pure Eisenberg-Noe framework as there is no future time point to repay the loan. Finally a firm is insolvent at time t if either it has negative equity or it was previously deemed insolvent.
Most prior works on dynamic network models consider a discrete time setting Capponi and Chen [2015] , Ferrara et al. [2016] , Kusnetsov and Veraart [2018] . As far as the authors are aware, the only two extensions of the Eisenberg-Noe framework to continuous time are Banerjee et al. [2018] , Sonin and Sonin [2017] . Neither of those works considers the mark-to-market equity of a bank in order to determine insolvency. That is the key innovation being provided in Section 3 of this work.
Mean Field Approaches
In the dynamic mean field approaches to systemic risk, the starting point is to identify each bank in a large financial system with some notion of its financial robustness or distance-to-default at any given time. Next, the financial system is then modelled as a system of interacting stochastic processes, whose values represent the current robustness. Typically, these models start from some form of Brownian dynamics, but colloquially one could say that they are built on the following premise: in contrast to a risk-neutral Black-Scholes world, the modelling of systemic risk calls for room to play with the drift and other aspects of the coefficients, in a way that takes into account the system as a whole. A concrete particle system. To fix ideas, let us consider a particular system of n banks, described by their distances-to-default X i and corresponding default times
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Letting X τ i (t) := X i (t ∧ τ i ), a simple 'structural' model of systemic risk (inspired by Carmona et al. [2015] ) could then be based on dynamics of the form
, for a family of independent Brownian motions B 0 , . . . , B n .
Here ρ > 0 models the presence of a 'common' noise, namely B 0 , that captures exposure to common risk factors, while θ > 0 incorporates an element of 'herding' in the drift that could, for example, be the result of banks engaging in similar strategies and other interbank connections.
To capture systemic risk, the natural quantities in this model are the average distance-to-default and the proportion of defaults given, respectively, by
Of course, an obvious weakness is the inherent symmetry in this model, and this is indeed a central point to be addressed later in this work when we return to the Eisenberg-Noe approach, as discussed in Section 2.1 above. For the purposes of this overview, however, we remain in the symmetric setting.
Mean field analysis of (2.2). Sending n → ∞ in (2.2), one can hope to simplify the analysis and simulation of the system, provided there is a law of large numbers effect. To see that there is indeed such an effect, note that M n t = ν n t , Id and L n t = 1 − ν n t (0, ∞), where the empirical measures ν n t := 1 n n i=1 1 t<τi δ X n i (t) are tracking the surviving banks. From it is then known that (ν n , M n , L n ) converges to a unique limit (ν, M, L),
for x ∈ (0, ∞), with an absorbing boundary condition at the origin, i.e. V t (0) = 0. The distribution of the limiting processes M and L can be used to give measures of systemic risk. For example, one can track the probability of seeing changes in M and L above some threshold over a short period of time. A simple observation is that, for larger θ > 0 and ρ > 0, the distribution of the change in L over a given period becomes more concentrated at the extremes with banks more likely to either survive or default together. Translating (2.3) to the language of McKean-Vlasov SDEs, we have
(2.4) This follows by an application of Itô's formula, which shows that (2.3) is the (nonlinear) stochastic Fokker-Planck equation for (2.4) absorbed at the origin, conditional on B 0 . That is, we have
. Building on the above, one could consider strategic interactions in (2.2) with costs and controls depending on M n and L n . This would then yield a mean field game involving the limit processes M and L. Without the common noise, a framework for this type of mean field game has recently been developed in the two consecutive papers Campi and Fischer [2018] , Campi et al.. Mean field models of contagion. Recently, a new line of mean field modelling has been proposed in , , Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019a] aimed at studying default contagion in large financial systems. Based on a 'structural' approach, these models introduce an endogenous notion of contagion in systems such as (2.2), by imposing that bankruptcies should cause a drop in the distances-to-default of the other banks. Mathematically, this amounts in one way or another to incorporating the proportion of defaults L n into the dynamics, thus leading to positive feedback loops whereby defaults can shift other banks into default. Variations of this approach and further theoretical results can be found in Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b] , Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] . Moreover, we note that closely related approaches to contagion (in a dynamic but finite-dimensional setting) have also been considered in Battiston et al., Lipton [2016] .
In terms of numerical implementation, Kaushansky et al. [2018c] , Kaushansky and Reisinger [2019] have proposed and analysed numerical schemes for the mean field model of , and it is noted in Kaushansky et al. [2018c] that a modified version of Lipton [2016] falls within this framework. These developments can be seen as following on from Itkin and Lipton [2017] , Kaushansky et al. [2018a,b] , where similar models are studied for systems of two or three banks, and we note that passing to the mean field limit yields a way of alleviating the curse of dimensionality arising from the couplings due (in particular) to mutual obligations in large financial systems.
In this paper we will show how a variant of these 'structural' approaches to contagion is intrinsically connected to a dynamic Eisenberg-Noe model with early defaults (as developed in Section 3). Moreover, we will show (in Sections 4 and 5) that the associated mean field limit can be derived and analysed rigorously by extending the techniques from , Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b] .
The broader mean field literature on systemic risk. If, for simplicity, the constraints on the state space in particle system (2.2) are dropped, then the dynamics are precisely those of the early papers Carmona et al. [2015] , Fouque and Sun [2013] , where X i now denotes the (logarithmic) cash-reserves of bank i and the mean-reversion models borrowing and lending in the interbank market. In Carmona et al. [2015] these dynamics emerge as a Nash equilibrium of a stochastic game (where drifts are controlled and it is costly to diverge from the mean) with a variant of (2.4) without absorption arising as the equilibrium dynamics for the limiting mean field game.
Starting from Fouque and , several other papers on systemic risk have studied different versions of this mean-reverting setup (mostly without the common noise). These contributions can be loosely grouped into: systems with stabilisation by a central agent Garnier et al. [2013 Garnier et al. [ , 2017 , games with delay Carmona et al. [2018] , Fouque and Zhang [2018] , games with model uncertainty Huang and Jaimungal [2017] , utility optimisation by the individual banks and a central bank Maheshwari and Sarantsev [2017] , methods for introducing heterogeneity Chong and Kluppelberg, Fang et al. [2017] , jump-diffusion dynamics Bo and Capponi [2018] , Borovykh et al. [2018] , Benazzoli et al. and connections to the theory of risk measures Biagini et al. [2019a] . Still focusing on mean-reversion, constraints on the state space have been considered via Feller type square root diffusions in Bo and Capponi [2018] , Fouque and , Shkolnikov and Ichiba [2013] , Sun [2018] (with various additional features) and, in such a framework, Capponi et al. [2019] has recently proposed a network structure with finitely many clusters of banks, where each cluster mean-reverts around different predetermined levels modelling the presence of target leverage ratios.
In addition to the 'structural' approaches to contagion discussed earlier, there is a separate literature on contagion in large financial systems, wherein defaults are dictated by exponential clocks as in the 'reduced-form' approach to credit risk. This leads to more implicit notions of contagion occurring at the level of the intensities. Firstly, Giesecke et al. [2013 Giesecke et al. [ , 2015 propose a system of interacting intensities that are self-exciting via dependence on the proportion of defaults. Secondly, somewhat closer in spirit to (2.2), Ichiba et al. [2019] identifies the financial health of each bank in a large system with a geometric Brownian motion, but with default dictated by an exponential clock whose intensity can depend on the banks own health and the average healthiness of the system. Contagion amounts to each default causing a drop in the healthiness of the other banks by a random fraction, which in turn increases the default intensities.
3 Dynamic Model of n Banks As mentioned above, the primary goal of this section is to introduce a dynamic network model to study default contagion in a finite system of banks. To do so, we seek to extend the dynamic network model of Banerjee et al. [2018] to incorporate early defaults due to negative (accounting) capital. This extension to include early defaults is novel and important in its own right. This will be utilised in Section 4 to consider a comparison with a mean field limit. More details on the reasons for undertaking that analysis are provided in Section 4, and we also refer to the brief discussion in the introduction above.
This section is broken into two subsections. First, in Section 3.1, we describe the stylized balance sheet of all banks in the system. This is used to define a general dynamic model for default contagion in the vein of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] , Rogers and Veraart [2013] . Second, we simplify the parameters so as to study a specialized network setup that facilitates the later analyses of this work. As the primary goal of this work is to merge the network and mean field approaches in the literature, we find this specialized network setup is instructive. For the analysis of this section, none of these additional assumptions are required for the theoretical results.
Briefly, before undertaking the analysis, we wish to consider some notation utilised throughout this work. Consider a financial system with n ∈ N financial institutions. This system does not include the central bank or other financial entities not included within this system; we will consider such an entity, called the "societal node" and denote it by node 0. Notationally, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of banks and N 0 = N ∪ {0} include the societal node. As we are considering a dynamic network model, consider a continuous set of clearing times T = [0, T ] for some (finite) terminal time T < ∞. For simplicity, assume throughout this work that the risk-free rate is 0 (r = 0). Finally, we will use the notation Z(t) for the value at time t ∈ T of a process Z : T → R n . We will now consider a model akin to the continuous-time setting of Banerjee et al. [2018] in that we allow for liabilities to change over time and for firms to have stochastic cash flows.
The Balance Sheet
In order to construct a continuous-time model we will begin by considering the stylized balance sheet for a generic bank i ∈ N in our system. This balance sheet comes from a dynamic version of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] . Throughout time, all assets are of only two types: interbank assets and external assets. All liabilities are either interbank (and thus assets for another bank j ∈ N in the system) or external and owed to the societal node 0.
In order to construct a continuous-time model we will begin by considering our network parameters of cash flows and nominal liabilities. We will now consider a banking system with stylized balance sheet as depicted in Figure 1 .
Balance Sheet @ t Assets Liabilities
External Let x i (T ) be the value of the external assets for firm i ∈ N 0 at the terminal time T . This will often be denoted in vector notation as x(T ). In mark-to-market accounting, at time t ∈ T, these external assets should be valued in (risk-neutral) expectation, i.e.,
The value of the external assets can, equivalently be described by the (marginal) cash flows external to the system, e.g., from depositors at the banks, as utilised in Banerjee et al. [2018] for a dynamic version of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] . In this context, we describe dx(t) to be the marginal change in the external assets at time t ∈ T, i.e., firm i ∈ N 0 has incoming external cash flows t2 t1 dx i (t) between times t 1 < t 2 . Throughout this work we will take the external assets to follow a non-negative (Itô) process.
In contrast, we will assume the total nominal liabilities matrix L is a deterministic process of time as these obligations are contractually generated and have fixed repayment schedule. In other words, by looking at all outstanding contracts at time 0, the total amount that is owed between any two institutions (and externally) up to any time can be determined exactly. Generally we will consider dL(t) to be the marginal change in nominal liabilities matrix at time t, i.e., the liabilities owed from time t 1 to t 2 are defined by t2 t1 dL(t) ∈ R (n+1)×(n+1) + . By assumption dL ij (t) ≥ 0 for all firms i, j ∈ N 0 as, without any payments made, total liabilities should accumulate over time. Additionally, dL ii (t) = 0 for all firms i ∈ N 0 to remove the possibility of self-dealing. This nominal liabilities matrix appears on both the asset and liabilities side firms. The liabilities for firm i is the total amount owed over T, i.e., j∈N0 L ij (T ) = j∈N0 T 0 dL ij (s). To simplify notation, we will define dp(t) := dL(t) 1 for any time t ∈ T to denote the marginal change in the total liabilities vector where 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n+1 ; correspondingly, the total liabilities owed by firm i over T are given byp i (T ). The interbank assets require consideration of historical price accounting since the interbank assets are generally nonmarketable. As such, firm i ∈ N 0 will give full value to all obligations (both past and future) j∈At L ji (T ) = j∈At T 0 dL ji (s) from solvent institutions A t at time t; for insolvent firms j ∈ N \A t , firm i will give full value up to the insolvency time τ j ∈ T (discussed further below), but only a fixed recovery rate R 2 ∈ [0, 1] on obligations from j after insolvency, i.e., τj 0 dL ji (s) + R 2 T τj dL ji (s) = (1 − R 2 )L ji (τ j ) + R 2 L ji (T ). Assumption 3.1. The modeling assumptions expressed above can be summarized thusly:
(i) the external assets of each bank follow a stochastic process (which can be correlated to each other) and (being marketable) are marked-to-market with risk-neutral measure P;
(ii) the interbank assets and liabilities are solely based on contracts written prior to time 0 and have fixed repayment schedule; and (iii) interbank assets (being nonmarketable) are valued using historical price accounting, i.e., priced at face value prior to a default event and reevaluated with the true recovery rate after default.
These three key modeling assumptions lead to a contagion mechanism in which defaults come as a shock to the system and cause a jump in the capital of any connected institution.
The shocks due to default outlined above are realistic since the interbank assets are nonmarketable. If, however, banks attempted a counterparty or network valuation adjustment (see, e.g., Barucca et al. [2016] , Banerjee and Feinstein [2019] ) default shocks would still be expected due to the assymetric and incomplete information available to the different banks. We also wish to note that the historical price accounting rule undertaken herein provides the greatest possible value for interbank assets and thus provides a bound on any other valuation system.
The balance sheet capital for firm i at time t ∈ T is exactly the difference on its balance sheet between assets and liabilities, i.e.,
(3.1)
Insolvency for bank i occurs at the first time that it has negative capital, i.e.,
and the set of solvent firms at time t is given by A t := {i ∈ N | τ i > t}.
Remark 3.2. The stochastic structure introduced herein is necessary for consideration of early defaults. Without it, the capital of banks would be deterministic and all defaults would be known at the initial time 0. Though Banerjee et al.
[2018] introduces a stochastic system for financial networks, it does not consider endogenous early defaults. That is an innovation of this work.
Remark 3.3. In the balance sheet approach considered herein, due to the full recovery of interbank assets prior to default and a fixed recovery after default, the details of the Eisenberg-Noe Eisenberg and Noe [2001] are only subtly utilised in the background. That is, the constant recovery implies a pro-rata repayment scheme as in the Eisenberg-Noe framework; the difference between this repayment scheme and that of Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart Rogers and Veraart [2013] is that recovery is on the liability side rather than the asset side. We take this as a simplification to ease the discussion and mathematics to focus primarily on the stylized contagion in this work. Additionally, we can consider this balance sheet framework as akin to the dynamic network models of Banerjee et al. [2018] , Sonin and Sonin [2017] , but adding in notions from the discretetime model of Capponi and Chen [2015] in which firms can default before the terminal time. In that work there is a detailed discussion on an auction model for determining the recovered assets in case of default from which the remaining debts are paid; this is in contrast to the simplified exogenous recovery rates. If we take the approach from Banerjee et al. [2018] in which firms pay off debts as they arrive and may have unpaid prior liabilities, the construction of the system dynamics requires further considerations. Briefly, let V i (t) denote the cash holdings of firm i at time t ∈ T. Let π ij (t) be the relative liabilities at time t. This is constructed in detail in a continuous-time setting in Banerjee et al. [2018] ; we refer to that paper for a detailed discussion of the construction of the relative liabilities in this general setting. It is possible that a firm has positive capital K i (t) > 0 but insufficient funds to cover short term liabilities; in such a setting we assume that the debts roll-forward when they go unpaid by a solvent firm as in Banerjee et al. [2018] , Sonin and Sonin [2017] . When a firm defaults, we consider a recovery rate R 1 ∈ [0, 1] on the unpaid previous debts and R 2 ∈ [0, 1] on future obligations. As such we have the cash holdings and (modified) capital equations at time t ∈ T as:
Much of the results of this work can be undertaken in this setting with a liability structure defined in Assumption 3.5. For simplification and from financial interpretation: we will be interested in the setting where R 1 = 1. We assume this from the idea that, prior to the default even though a firm may be illiquid, it is solvent and thus some lender of last resort will guarantee these obligations that rolled forward.
The Simplified Model
We will make the following assumptions for the remainder of this paper. These can be relaxed as in Banerjee et al. [2018] and discussed briefly in Remark 3.3, but as the goal of this work is to demonstrate a simple and clear comparison between a dynamic Eisenberg-Noe model and default contagion in the mean field limit we will consider this simplification.
Assumption 3.4. Throughout this work we consider a short time horizon T model wherein the liability repayment schedule is constant over time, i.e., dL ij (t) = λ ij dt for i, j ∈ N 0 with λ ii = 0 and λ 0j (t) = 0, and L(0) = 0.
The constant nature of the network, as defined in Assumption 3.4, is valid for a short time frame. Since financial crises occur over short time horizons, this fixed nature is therefore appropriate. Further, this allows us to study how the initial network topology can cause default contagion and, ultimately, a systemic crisis.
For the remainder of this paper we will introduce the notation
to denote the difference between obligations (external and interbank) and interbank assets. Typically we will assumeL i (T ) > 0 for all firms i, i.e., bank i has liabilities that cannot be offset solely by interbank assets. Under such an assumption, every bank is a net borrower overall (in the sense that total obligations are larger than interbank assets); this is true even if a bank is not a net borrower in the interbank system.
Assumption 3.5. For simplification and ease of use, we will assume for the remainder of this paper that the external cash flows follow (possibly time-dependent) correlated geometric Brownian motions, i.e.,
for vector of correlated Brownian motions W .
Under the setting of Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5, we can compute the capital process K(t) from (3.1) as:
( 3.2) In order to determine (3.2), we take advantage of the external assets following a geometric Brownian motion to find
Assumption 3.6. We wish to assume that no banks are in default at time t = 0. This is equivalent to bounding the initial external assets from below, i.e., Proof. First, recall that the default times are defined by τ i = inf{t ∈ T | K i (t) < 0} for bank i. The fixed point problem for the capital process K only depends on itself through the default times τ . Now, consider the fixed point in the capital process. Note that as the capital process K decreases the default times τ all decrease. Further, as banks default, the entire system's wealth drops as well since R 2 < 1. With this, we are able to complete this proof through a use of Tarski's fixed point theorem.
Throughout the remainder of this work, we will focus on the greatest clearing solution K ↑ . In the Eisenberg-Noe framework, this is computed using a fictitious default algorithm. Briefly, such an algorithm assumes that at time t ∈ T, any bank that was solvent prior to t (A t− ) is assumed to still be solvent; this is the best case scenario for all banks due to the downward stresses from a default. Solvency (K i (t) ≥ 0) of all banks is then checked under this scenario; if no banks default we can move forward in time, otherwise any new defaults may cause a domino effect of further defaults. In the case of defaults, we update the balance sheet of all solvent firms to determine if this shock causes a cascade of failures. This sequential testing for new defaults and updating the balance sheets continue until no new defaults occur. In practice this algorithm is run using an event finding algorithm to determine the time of the initial default, at that time the cascading defaults are determined until the system re-stabilises at a new set of solvent institutions, and the stochastic processes evolve normally until the next default event. This is demonstrated in Figure 2 where the insolvency of one bank causes another bank to default as well. If desired, the least clearing solution K ↓ could be found analogously with a fictitious solvency algorithm instead.
We wish to preview a consideration of the cascade condition of Section 4.3.1 and Section 5.3.1 which is a rule for determining the size of default cascades (tailored to our later reformulation of the Eisenberg-Noe banking system as a stochastic interacting particle system). We do this to highlight the similarity between this condition and the fictitious default algorithm widely used in the (finite) network setting. Further, we wish to emphasise that, in the mean field framework, a cascade needs to be defined more carefully, as liabilities between institutions are infinitesimals and it is no longer meaningful to talk about defaults of individual banks. The details underlying the definition of the cascade condition are provided in Section 5.2, and we emphasise already here that the iterations of this cascade condition correspond analogously with the fictitious default algorithm (see, in particular, Section 5.2.2 for the precise description of the resolution of default cascades). As far as the authors are aware, a connection between the fictitious default algorithm and the cascade condition presented herein, or its predecessors in the mean field literature, has not previously been investigated.
We conclude this section with consideration of two numerical examples. The first is the description of the small 3 bank system shown in Figure 2 . We then consider a larger system with a core-periphery structure. As noted in Craig and Von Peter [2014] , Fricke and Lux [2015] , many real world financial systems exhibit a core-periphery structure.
Example 3.8. This example will be constructed to demonstrate the primary features of the model, namely early defaults and the contagion thereof. Consider a n = 3 bank system over a time horizon T = [0, 1] for simplicity. These banks are connected to each other through interbank obligations λ =   0 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 1   where the last column denotes the obligations λ ·0 to the societal node. These banks hold identical, correlated external assets following the geometric Brownian motion dx
The initial value of these external assets are chosen so that the initial capital of all banks is 1, i.e., set x i (0) = 2e −1 (which results in K i (0) = 1) for all banks i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By setting the parameters in this way we satisfy Assumptions 3.4-3.6. Finally, we fix the recovery rate for defaulted assets to be R 2 = 0.1. One realisation of this system is shown in Figure 2 . In that realisation, bank 3 defaults due to its own investments at time τ 3 ≈ 0.6. This causes bank 2 to default at that time τ 2 ≈ 0.6 as well due to the shock to its own capital from re-marking its interbank assets. Bank 1 remains solvent for the studied time frame T but a large negative shock is exhibited on its capital due to the default of both banks 2 and 3.
The following example is a 10 bank system exhibiting the core-periphery structure. This network topology is discussed in more detail in Borgatti and Everett [2000] , Fricke and Lux [2015] . Of particular note, empirical studies (see, e.g., Craig and Von Peter [2014] , Fricke and Lux [2015] ) have demonstrated that real-world financial systems exhibit this structure. In undertaking this study, two network structures will be considered: first, a highly connected networks with small obligations from peripheral to peripheral institutions; second, we consider the same network but with no obligations between peripheral institutions. The second, approximate, network has a limit to its rank, i.e., the rank of the second network obligation matrix is bounded by twice the number of core institutions. This approximating network, with a much sparser network, is more tractable computationally and, as such, will be used to motivate a rank decomposition structure in the mean field limit of the dynamic network model discussed within this section. For more details, we refer to the next section.
Example 3.9. Consider a n = 10 bank core-periphery system with 2 core banks and 8 peripheral Bank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Full Network -0.173 0.173 0.042 0.179 0.173 ---0.173 Reduced Network -0.172 0.172 0.041 0.189 0.172 ---0.172 Table 1 : Default times for institutions in Example 3.9 under a single realisation of the external assets. Normed difference between these default times is 0.0097.
ones. These banks are interconnected with the (randomized) interbank liabilities 
and all banks owe $1 to the societal node. As in real financial systems, there are sparse, and small, obligations between peripheral firms. For a comparison, consider a reduced system of obligations so that the obligations between peripheral firms are zeroed out, i.e., 
This reduced systemλ has rank 4 instead of full rank for the original network. In Table 1 , the default time for each bank is reported under the original (full) and reduced networks. Notably, though these default times are not identical, they capture the general behavior quite accurately. We will take advantage of this notion of the reduced system in the following sections.
In the next section, we start from the above example and discuss the mean field limit that results from sending the number of banks to infinity in a suitable way.
A core-periphery mean field model
As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the main motivation for the present section is theoretical in nature: the aim being to close a gap between the network literature on systemic risk and recent mean field contagion models. Specifically, we will relate the finite interbank system from Section 3 to a mean field limit described by a conditional McKean-Vlasov problem akin to the problems studied in , , Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] , Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b,a] .
Aside from this theoretical perspective, there are several good practical reasons for studying the mean field limit of the model proposed in Section 3. First of all, the mean field limit rigorously facilitates a low parameter space, which can allow for a clearer identification of the main mechanisms at work, and which may serve as a vehicle for defining macroscopic events. Secondly, the mean field limit can allow for more efficient numerical simulations by replacing a large system of coupled SDEs with a single limiting object. Thirdly, one is unlikely to have precise data for the liabilities matrix, but the mean field limit makes a rigorous case for working with an approximate distribution. Finally, the lower parameter space can facilitate calibration to the average of a large sample of banks, as opposed to the unfeasible task of fitting fully heterogeneous parameters in the finite dynamic system.
In the present section, we focus on the financial motivation and thus restrict attention to the core-periphery structure discussed at the end of Section 3. This leads us to introduce a particular intuitive and tractable mean field point of view on the Eisenberg-Noe style interbank system from Section 3. While we give a careful presentation of the mathematical results for the mean field limit, along with a numerical example, the theoretical details are left to Section 5, which treats a more general framework.
A simple model of core-periphery interbank networks
Before addressing the mean field setup, consider a finite financial system of size n = m 0 consisting of m c core banks and m p := m 0 − m c peripheral banks, where the peripheral banks are defined by not having any liabilities towards each other. In other words, the liabilities matrix for the system can be written in the block form
We could also work with sparse connections between the peripheral banks, but the idea here is to keep the model simple and focus on the core-periphery interactions, so we simply zero out the periphery-to-periphery interactions in line with the discussion in Section 3.2 above.
In general, the λ ij 's can be completely different for each pair of banks (i, j), but it is natural to suppose that they are nonetheless representative of some underlying structure in terms of how the core and peripheral banks interact. One tractable way of capturing this is to declare that
where the ( i , δ i )'s are random samples from P ⊗ P , for some distribution P with mean zero and support in [−1, 1] (or similar), and theλ ij 's are the fixed entries of a nicer matrixλ m0×m0 , which defines the underlying structure of the network. For concreteness, let us consider the specific examplê
In this case, there are two core banks (i.e., m c = 2) and the peripheral banks can be divided into two groups (of size m p,1 and m p,2 with m p = m p,1 + m p,2 ) in terms of how they interact with the core. Nevertheless, the real connections are subject to noise-modelled by (4.2)-and hence λ m0×m0 can feature much more asymmetry in the core-periphery interactions.
Growing the number of banks to infinity
Starting from the above system of size m 0 , we now introduce a natural way of growing it to infinity. Based on the 'initializing' system of size m 0 , for each m ≥ 1, the idea is to construct a system of size n = mm 0 according to the following procedure:
• multiply each of the m c core banks into m analogous entities (that can be seen as subentities comprising a core bank of m times the size of the original), for a total of mm c core entities
• multiply each of the m p peripheral banks into m analogous peripheral entities, for a total of mm p peripheral entities
• let the external assets of each entity have an i.i.d. copy of the same initial condition as well as the same drift and volatility as the original bank up to an i.i.d. noise.
• impose that the m sub-entities of a given core bank do not have liabilities towards each other (which is enforcing no self-dealing within the core bank)
• impose that, up to noise, the liability positions between a given core and peripheral entity are the same as those between the original core and peripheral bank only scaled by m −1 (meaning that the underlying network structure is preserved and, the noise aside, each entity has the same total liabilities as the original bank of which it is a copy)
To be precise, starting from an underlying matrixλ m0×m0 as in the example (4.3), we construct the n = mm 0 'th system by first fixing the underlying network structure through the mappingλ
and then the liabilities matrix λ mm0×mm0 is defined by setting
as in (4.2). Here theλ ij 's are now the entries ofλ mm0×mm0 given in (4.4), and the ( i , δ i )'s are random samples drawn from the distribution P ⊗ P , for a given probability measure P . We stress that, due to the noise, the entries of λ mm0×mm0 can be entirely heterogeneous both across and within groups. In particular, a given sub-entity of the first core bank may interact differently with all entities representing the second core bank, and any given core entity may interact differently with all peripheral entities across the two groupings. Nevertheless, by passing to the mean field limit we may hope to discover the underlying structure as defined by the 'initializing' matrixλ m0×m0 . The remaining subsections illustrate this for the specific example provided by (4.3).
The dynamics of the finite interbank system
Returning to the Eisenberg-Noe model from Section 3, consider a finite system of size n, and note that the capital (3.2) of each bank i = 1, . . . , n can be written as a coupled system
For simplicity, we will assume thatL i (T ) = T Λ i for some constants Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n > 0, meaning that, for each bank i, its total liabilities net of interbank assets over the period [0, T ] is given by the positive amount T Λ i . In particular, if a bank is a net lender in the interbank market, then the surplus is more than offset by external liabilities, which is in line with what is observed in practice. Recalling that each x i (t) is a geometric Brownian motion, it is convenient to work with the following logarithmic 'distances-to-default' defined by
, (4.8)
for i = 1, . . . , n. This transforms the system (4.6)-(4.7) into the equivalent system
Moreover, we will assume that the Brownian motions are only correlated through a common noise, meaning that we can write W
Since the default times τ i are part of the equations for the distances-to-default X i , one has to be careful that there can be several solutions to (4.9) depending on how one decides if a bank is in default at time t. For example, even if X i (t ) > 0 for all the banks, one may succeed in defaulting a few-or even all-of them at time t, provided the corresponding increase of the L n i (t)'s make X i (t) drop below zero for precisely the banks we decided to default, where X i (t) := X i (t ) − {jump from increase in L n i (t)}. Moreover, if it is indeed the case that X i (t ) ≤ 0 for some bank i, then we need to decide (in a way that is consistent with the equations) how this propagates as it may start a cascade of defaults at the same time t, for which there can again be multiple possible choices (much in line with the previous example).
The solution we choose to work with here amounts to picking the solution that gives the greatest clearing capital in the Eisenberg-Noe framework (see Lemma 3.7) with any instantaneous default cascades resolved by an analogue of the Eisenberg-Noe fictitious default algorithm. In Section 5.2 we show how this corresponds to amending the particle system (4.9) with what we call the cascade condition-see (5.12) for its precise definition and derivation, albeit in a more general setting than the specific example considered here. This condition is intrinsic to the particle system formulation of our interbank model, and it uniquely determines the loss processes L n i at 'time t' given the state of the system immediately before, namely at 'time t ' in the sense of taking a left limit. In particular, this ensures that (4.9) has a unique strong càdlàg solution, as argued in the proof of Proposition 5.5. We will not discuss this condition any further here, but we briefly present its mean field analogue in Section 4.3.2 below.
The dynamics of the mean field limit
For any given m ≥ 1, and a fixed initial size m 0 , we will now consider the interbank system of size n = mm 0 modelled by (4.9), where the liabilities matrix and the other parameters are noisy realisations of the underlying core-periphery network structure defined by the concrete example (4.3). Specifically, we impose that:
• the liabilities matrix λ mm0×mm0 is constructed from (4.3) via random samples ( , δ) from the distribution P ⊗ P as outlined in the previous subsection.
• the i'th set of parameters (x i (0), σ i , µ i , Λ i ) is given as a function of the i'th random sample δ i , where the function is the same for all entities of the same type (out of the two core types and two peripheral types defined by (4.3)).
Based on the analysis in Section 5, it follows that the system we just described has a welldefined mean field limit as n → ∞ (see, in particular, Section 5.3.5). This limit captures the coupled evolution of the four underlying types of banks (two core and two peripheral) after averaging over the infinitely many entities within each type. Let I ⊂ [−1, 1] denote the support of the distribution P , and let θ → (σ l,θ , µ l,θ , Λ l,θ ) denote the parameter function for each of the four types l = 1, . . . , 4. Let us say that l = 1, 2 are the two core types and l = 3, 4 are the two peripheral types (in correspondence with m c = 1 + 1 and m p = m p,1 + m p,2 in (4.3)). To simplify the presentation of the mean field limit below, we write
for l = 1, . . . , 4, and θ ∈ I, where B 0 and B 1 , . . . , B 4 are independent Brownian motions.
As the number of banks grows to infinity (in accordance with Section 4.1.1), the results of Section 5 below show that mean field limit of the finite interbank system is given by the coupled
(4.10)
for l = 1, . . . , 4, where the strength of the core-core and core-periphery interactions are fully captured by the simplified liabilities matrix
and V l 0 (· | θ) are the initial densities for the distances-to-default of the four types l = 1, . . . , 4 conditional on θ ∈ I. See (4.17) below for how these initial conditions relate to the parameters and the initial laws of the external assets.
Note that the contagion in (4.10) is no longer felt as the result of a single default event. Instead, there are now four 'infinite collections' of entities (corresponding to the four underlying types) who feel the contagion through the mutual exposuresλ ij in relation to the proportion of defaults within each infinite collection (given by the loss processes L l , for l = 1, . . . , 4). In the McKean-Vlasov formulation (4.10), these proportions of default are really 'average' probabilities of default for the entities of each type, but see also the SPDE formulation (4.12)-(4.13) below which makes the interpretation in terms of proportions more explicit.
contagion from a given proportion of defaults within the two peripheral groups at a strength multiplied by m p,1 and m p,2 , respectively, and, similarly, (ii) the peripheral groups feel contagion from the core at a strength multiplied by m p,1 and m p,2 .
Stochastic evolution equations for the densities
Consider, for simplicity of presentation, the case where P is a Dirac mass at zero (so θ drops from the equations), meaning that there is no additional heterogeneity within each of the four types (for practical purposes, one can think of having replaced the parameters by their mean values averaged over P ). By applying Itô's formula, and taking expectations conditional on B 0 , we can reformulate (4.10) as a system of four coupled (nonlinear and nonlocal) stochastic partial differential euqations (SPDEs). These SPDEs govern the (stochastic) densities of the distances-to-default for the four infinite collections of banks of a given type (conditional on the common noise B 0 ). This is arguably the more natural point of view for the dynamics of the mean field limit. Specifically, we have
where V = (V 1 , . . . , V 4 ) solves a coupled system of SPDEs on the positive half-line of the form
with the Dirichlet boundary condition V l t (0) = 0, for each l = 1, . . . , 4. Note that this point of view makes clear the precise nature of the contagion: namely a nonlinear transportation of mass towards the origin, at a rate that is proportional to the current rates of default within each infinite collection of banks (as mediated by the mutual exposuresλ ij between the four infinite collections). Indeed, in dt amounts of time, the proportion of defaults within the l'th collection of banks is precisely d L l (t), since L l (t) gives the total loss of mass for the l'th collection of banks up to and including time t (i.e., the accumulated proportion of defaults).
We note that, due to the irregularity in time of the common noise B 0 , the time derivative of L l (t) does not exist if ρ > 0, but the process is increasing, so the integrals against it are well-defined. Still, in order for the SPDE formulation (4.13) to make sense globally, as it is, we are implicitly relying on each L l being continuous. As we already discussed above, this may be violated, meaning that one (or more) of the loss processes L l can undergo a jump discontinuity, corresponding to an instantaneous macroscopic default cascade within the infinite collection of the l'th type (or types). Nevertheless, one can still attach a rigorous meaning to the SPDE, as long as it is understood to only hold on the random intervals between jump times in the following sense: at a jump time t, the densities are shifted according to the jump size, and thus the system of SPDE is restarted from the new set of initial conditions
where V l t is the pointwise left-limit of V l s as s ↑ t,
for l = 1, . . . , 4.
Note that we must allow the Dirichlet boundary condition to be violated when restarting at a jump time (and, as Remark 4.2 below points out, it is also a loss of the Dirichlet condition that leads to a jump). As concerns the timing and the sizes of the jumps, these are defined (in a càdlàg fashion) by what we call the mean field cascade condition, namely
This condition for the jumps is the mean field analogue of the cascade condition for the finite system discussed at the end of Section 4.2. Intuitively, it amounts to subjecting the system to an arbitrarily small shock that ignites a fictitious default cascade and then keeping track of how it propagates in relation to the size of the initial shock: as we send the size of the initial shock to zero, either the size of the fictitious cascade goes to zero, and there is then no jump, or it converges to something positive, and this positive value is then the size of the jump corresponding to a bona fide instantaneous default cascade. The mean field cascade condition is carefully developed and motivated in Section 5. It is a special case of the condition (5.16) in Section 5.3, which addresses a more general framework than the one considered in this section.
Remark 4.2. As we note in Section 4.3.2 below, the cascade condition gives ∆L l (t) = 0 for every l = 1, . . . , 4, whenever each left-limit density V l t (x) vanishes as x ↓ 0. More generally, there is no jump at time t provided Ξ l (t, ) < for small enough > 0, for each l = 1, . . . , 4, as follows by the same arguments as in Section 5.3.2. To see how this condition being violated can lead to a jump, consider the case where, at some time t, we have
for small enough > 0, for some pair of banks i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} withλ ij > 0 andλ ji > 0, meaning that banks in the i'th and j'th groups are exposed to each other (with i = j being a possibility, provided banks within the same group are exposed to each other in a way that is significant in the mean field limit). Now suppose for a contradiction that ∆L(t) = 0. Then the cascade condition implies that we can make lim m↑∞ ∆ (m,ε) t,· as small as we like (since it vanishes as ↓ 0). Thus, (4.16) together with the dominated convergence theorem gives
for small enough > 0, and the same conclusion holds with i and j interchanged. Together, these two inequalities yield a contradiction, and hence we conclude that there must indeed be a jump. With (i, j) = (1, 4) this corresponds to the situation at the jump time in Figure 3 . Of course, there is nothing sacred about the size n = 4, and, unlike the particular interactions in (4.11), we could in general have a nonzero diagonal, so i = j is perfectly valid if the core sub-entities within a given collection are exposed to contagion from each other.
In order to better illustrate the dynamics of the mean field limit, we present a numerical simulation of the system of SPDEs (4.12)-(4.13) with jumps governed by the mean field cascade condition (4.15) via (4.14). The outcome is plotted in Figure 3 , which shows a heat plot for each of the four solutions (t, x) → V l t (x) to the coupled system of SPDEs. The simulation is performed using an adaptation of the numerical scheme proposed in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Sect. 4.2] . The interactions are given byλ4×4 in (4.11) with mp,1 = mp,2 = 4, as in Example 3.9. The parameters are constant (with 'Periphery 1' and 'Core 2' having a more positive drift), and the initial conditions can be read off the heat plots at time t = 0. The common noise starts out on a slight negative trend, which instigates a default cascade between the low performing fractions of 'Core 1' and 'Periphery 2', resulting in both fractions defaulting in their entirety. Moreover, these defaults spill into a severe downgrading of the financial health of 'Core 2'. However, 'Core 2' was otherwise performing well, so only a very small proportion of it defaults, and since 'Periphery 1' is only exposed to defaults in 'Core 2', this means that these events have no significant impact on 'Periphery 1'.
In terms of the related mathematical literature, we stress that the papers Delarue et al. [2019] , , Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b] , Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019a] are focused on 'one-dimensional' variations of McKean-Vlasov problems akin to (4.10), whereas the recent paper Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] studies a coupled system analogous to (4.10) with only minor differences. In particular, Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] provides an existence result based on a Schauder fixed point argument (but no results on uniqueness) and studies criteria under which any solution to the system must incur a blow-up. However, unlike the present paper, the results in Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] neither address the relation to a finite particle system, nor do they consider a condition for uniquely specifying the jump sizes (in contrast to our cascade condition).
On the ruling out of instantaneous default cascades
Due the averaging effect of passing to the mean field limit, one could reasonably expect the limiting loss processes L l to evolve continuously, and anything else would be somewhat surprising given that the McKean-Problem is driven by continuous Brownian dynamics. In many cases, it will indeed be true that the system evolves continuously. However, as we have just seen in Figure 3 , depending on the parameters, one or more of the loss processes may see their speed of increase diverge to infinity in a way that results in a jump discontinuity (see also [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Thm. 2.7 ] in a simplified setting). Naturally, such an event can be seen as defining an instantaneous 'macroscopic' default cascade that survived the passage to the mean field limit.
In order to decide whether the solution is continuous or not, and in order to specify the size of a potential jump, we must amend (4.10) with the mean field cascade condition introduced above. As already mentioned, the details of this are reserved for Section 5, however, it is worth taking a few moments to preview a simple result on when jumps can be ruled out, which illustrates the workings of the cascade condition.
Section 5.3.2 presents a simple criterion for the initial densities that rules out a jump immediately after initializing the system. As above, we consider the case where there is no dependence on θ, and note that the initial densities are then of the form
where v l 0 is the initial density for the external asset process of banks of type l (which is supported on x > Λ l T e −µ l T ). If, for every l = 1, . . . , 4, there is a small l > 0 such that
then there is not an instant jump at time t = 0 and the solution remains continuous for a small amount of time after initialization.
Remark 4.3. If each x → v l 0 (x) is continuous near the boundary x = Λ l T e −µ l T and v l 0 (x) vanishes as x ↓ Λ l T e −T µ l T , then clearly (4.18) is satisfied. However, if v l 0 (x) converges to something strictly positive as x ↓ Λ l T e −µ l T , then the values of the parameters become decisive. At any given time t ≥ 0, the mean field cascade condition (5.16) gives the precise criterion for whether or not there is a jump, and what the size of the jump is, if there is one. However, here we only note that there is a simple (non-optimal) time-t analogue of (4.18) for ruling out jumps at any given time t and in some short time interval thereafter. To see what this looks like, let V l be given by (4.13); that is, V l s (x) denotes the density of solvent banks of type l with distance-to-default x at time s, for a fixed realisation of the common noise B 0 . If, for each l = 1, . . . , 4, there is a small l such that
then there is no jump at time t and the solution is guaranteed to remain continuous for a short time thereafter. Note that the criterion involves the left limit V l t (x) = lim s↑t V l s (x), meaning that it is based on the state of the system strictly before time t (where the state of the system is given by the distance-to-default densities for the solvent banks of the four types). The reader is referred to Section 5.3 for further details.
Convergence and well-posedness of the mean field
Recall that we transformed the capital (3.2) of each bank into an interacting particle system (4.9) based on the notion (4.8) of their logarithmic distances-to-default. The remaining part of the paper is dedicated to a careful analysis of this particle system and its mean field limit. In relation to the previous section, we carry out the analysis under a more general assumption on the coefficients and the structure of the liabilities matrix (as n → ∞). We then show in Section 5.3.5 how to obtain the core-periphery model of Section 4 as a special case of this framework.
The finite interbank system
To streamline the presentation, we will work with a general version of the system of interacting distances-to-default (4.9). That is, we will focus on general particle systems of the form
where each X i denotes the distance-to-default of 'bank i' as derived from the expression for bank i's capital (3.1) in the dynamic Eisenberg-Noe framework of Section 3. We recall that the transformation from (3.1) to an interacting system of distances-to-default was carried out in Section 4.2. The precise assumptions for the particle system are outlined in what follows. First of all, we will assume that, for large n, the rank of the liabilities matrices λ n×n is bounded by some value k (uniformly in large n > k). Then, for large n > k, we have a factorization of the form nλ n×n = U n×k V k×n .
( 5.2) Here the natural choice of factorization comprises the matrices U n×k := (ũ ij ) and V k×n := (ς iṽij ) built from the singular value decomposition nλ n×n =Ũ diag(ς)Ṽ , where diag(ς) is the n × n diagonal matrix with the singular values ς 1 , . . . , ς n on the diagonal (out of which no more than the first k values are nonzero, since the rank is bounded by k). Spectral decompositions and low rank structures are omnipresent in statistical analysis and the applied sciences more generally. In relation to financial networks and systemic risk, simple aspects of this has, e.g., been utilised in contagion models , Cont and Schaanning [2019] and statistical methods for detecting core-periphery network structures Cucuringu et al. [2016] . More recently, the preprint Spiliopoulos and Yang [2019] studies a reduced form model for default clustering (based on interacting default intensities), using a singular value decomposition of the adjacency matrix in a way that is completely analogous to what we do here; namely to study the large population limit of the system under a bounded rank assumption which allows for a more tractable reformulation of the interactions.
Example 5.1. Suppose the liabilities matrix λ n×n is constructed from an underlying matrix λ m0×m0 , as in (4.4)-(4.5), whereλ m0×m0 is of the block form (4.4). Then the rank ofλ m0×m0 is at most 2m 0 , and one easily verifies that the rank of λ n×n also stays bounded by 2m 0 for any system of size n = mm 0 , for all multiples m ≥ 1. This yields a particular example where the rank remains bouned as n → ∞. We return to this in Section 5.3.5, where we detail how the model in Section 4 appears as a special case of the analysis presented here.
Note that (5.2) amounts to
where u il is (i, l)-entry of U n×k and v lj is the (l, j)-entry of V k×n . Based on this, the utility of (5.2) lies in the simple fact that we can now decompose the processes L n i from (4.7) as
u jl 1 t≥τj , for i = 1, . . . , n. Crucially, these new loss processes L n l , for l = 1, . . . , k, do not depend on i and, equally important, the number of them, namely k, is fixed as n → ∞.
In order to make precise the financial meaning of (5.3), we interpret the entries of U n×k and V k×n as latent factors identifying k underlying channels of contagion in the network structure (independently of the size n):
• u jl captures how strongly bank j contributes to the contagion of channel l, and
• v li captures how exposed bank i is contagion from channel l Let u 1 , . . . , u n ∈ R k denote the n row vectors of U n×k and v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ R k denote the n column vectors of V k×n . That is,
(5.4)
Then bank i is characterized by the pair of k-dimensional vectors u i and v i , detailing, respectively, how it contributes to each of the k (latent) channels of contagion and how it is impacted by them. Nevertheless, once we have identified the k channels of contagion, the vector v i alone can be seen as identifying bank i in terms of how it is hit by contagion: if two banks have similar v i 's, they are similar in this crucial sense (although they may of course be dissimilar in terms of how strongly they contribute to contagion overall and to each of the various channels).
Remark 5.2. In Section 4 we considered a specific core-periphery structure where the peripheral groups could be identified strictly by how they interact with the core (via the underlying matrix λ m0×m0 ). In practice, the interbank liabilities may comprise a perturbation of this structure which is more heterogeneous (in addition to the noisiness) but nonetheless still of low rank (e.g. due to asymmetric but sparse periphery-to-periphery connections). Thus, we may not have a small number of clear-cut groups as in Section 4, but the low rank (uniformly in n) would still allow the system to be decomposed into a small number of latent channels of contagion.
Relying on the decomposition (5.3), the particle system (5.1) is transformed to take the form
u jl 1 t≥τj , τ j = inf{t ≥ 0 : X j (t) ≤ 0}, l = 1, . . . , k.
(5.5)
Here, and it what follows, we assume that the Brownian motions W i are correlated through a single common Brownian motion. That is, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have W i (t) = ρB 0 (t) + 1 − ρ 2 B i (t) for a family of independent Brownian motions B 0 , . . . , B n . In terms of the coefficients in (5.5) we impose the following structural conditions which are motivated by the desire to include the original system (4.9) and keep the analysis as simple as possible.
Assumption 5.3. F is Lipschitz continuous and increasing with F (0) = 0, while g is continuous, non-negative, and decreasing. Furthermore, the asymmetry of the drifts and the volatilities is of the form b i (s) = b ui,vi (s) and σ i (s) = σ ui,vi (s). Finally, b u,v and σ u,v are deterministic functions of time, and we ask that |ρ| < 1 and ≤ σ u,v ≤ −1 , for a uniform constant > 0, as well as ρσ u,v ∈ C κ (R), for some κ > 1/2.
Recall that the pair of k-dimensional vectors u i and v i from (5.4) characterize bank i in relation to interbank contagion. Together with the (random) initial conditions X i (0), for i = 1, . . . , n, this describes the asymmetry in the interbank market. In order to obtain something meaningful as the number of banks goes to infinity, we need to impose some structure through the convergence of their joint empirical measures defined by
Assumption 5.4. First of all, we assume |u i | + |v i | ≤ C, for some C > 0, uniformly in i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. Secondly, we ask that each (u i , v i , X i (0)) is independent of the driving Brownian motions. Thirdly, we ask that n converges weakly to a probability measure ∈ P(R k × R k × R + ), which we write as a joint law = Law(u, v, X(0)) with d (u, v, x) = dν 0 (x|u, v)dˆ (u, v), whereˆ = Law(u, v) and ν 0 (·|u, v) is the regular conditional law of X(0)
given (u, v) = (u, v) . Finally, letting S(u) := supp(Law(u)) and likewise for v, we assume S(u) and S(v) are compact, and that for any v ∈ S(v) we have k l=1 u l v l ≥ 0 for all u ∈ S(u), as in the finite system of size n where k l=1 u l v l = nλ ij ≥ 0 for every u = u i and v = v j . As we already pointed out in Section 4.2, the particle system (5.5) needs to be amended with a condition for how to resolve defaults (that is consistent with the equations and corresponds to the greatest clearing capital solution in Lemma 3.7). This is achieved by insisting on the cascade condition (5.12) which is the subject of the next subsection (Section 5.2).
Proposition 5.5 (Well-posedness of the particle system). Let Assumption 5.3 be in place. Equipped with the cascade condition (5.12), as defined in Section 5.2 below, the system (5.5) has a unique strong càdlàg solution.
Proof. Up until the first default time, the system trivially has a unique strong solution that is continuous in time. Since we insist on the cascade condition (5.12), the number of defaulting banks at the first default time is uniquely specified, and this then uniquely determines how to restart the system. Defining the solution recursively, for each of at most n stopping times, we obtain a unique strong solution with càdlàg paths.
Characterizing the size of default cascades
In this section we make precise when the loss processes L n l (t) should jump and what the size of each jump should be given the possibility of a default cascade-that is, when the default of one bank immediately forces more banks into default at the same instance of time. This takes some care in order to ensure the consistency with the system (5.5), but ultimately the situation is resolved by identifying the correct fixed point of an iterated mapping (as presented in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.1). At first sight, the notation we introduce may appear a little abstract, but it leads to the convenient formulation (5.12) of what we call the cascade condition, which characterizes the jump sizes of the particle system in an intrinsic way, and which guides the identification of the analogous condition for the mean field limit. As discussed in Section 3.2, this cascade condition is conceptually related to the fictitious default algorithm of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] .
Fix n ≥ 1 and consider the mapping from the type vector v i to the total losses felt by bank i given by v i → L n vi (t) := k l=1 v li L n l (t), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Recalling the decomposition (5.3), we simply have L n vi (t) = L n i (t), but the point is to isolate how the asymmetric i-dependence arises strictly as a function of the vector v i (whose k components capture how significant banks of 'type' l = 1, . . . , k are to bank i). Notice that, while each t → L n l (t) in principle need not be increasing (depending on the rank factorization), the full process t → L n vi (t) = L n i (t) is by definition increasing. Given a càdlàg path t → η(t), we write ∆η(t) := η(t) − η(t ). Then we can observe that, at any time t ≥ 0, the jump sizes of the loss processes must satisfy
for each l = 1 . . . , k, where ∆F n i (t) is the amount by which the i'th distance-to-default (or particle) is shifted down at time t (due to losses from defaults at time t), namely
Consequently, once we have identified the correct sizes of the jumps ∆L n vi (t), for i = 1, . . . , n, all the jump sizes ∆L n l (t), for l = 1, . . . , k, are automatically uniquely specified by (5.7). Indeed, the events {t ≤ τ i } and the values t 0 g(s)dL n i (s), for i = 1 . . . , n, are all fixed at time t, since they are given as left-limits of the evolution of the system strictly before time t. On the other hand, the values ∆L n vi (t) are to be determined at time t, and they will involve a choice, amounting to how we choose to resolve default cascades.
Fixed point constraints and the cascade condition
As for L n vi (t) above, it is important to realise that the i-dependence of ∆F n i (t) is again a function of v i alone. In order to make this clear (and to streamline the mathematical presentation), we introduce the random map Θ :
Clearly, we then have ∆F n i (t) = Θ(t; ∆L n , v i ), so we can rewrite (5.7) as
As already alluded to above, this shows that: once we pin down the mapping v → ∆L n v , then the correct jumps of L n 1 , . . . , L n k are automatically specified by the constraint (5.9). Looking at (5.9), we immediately obtain a constraint for v → ∆L n v by simply summing over l = 1, . . . , k weighted by the v il 's, which yields the identity
Note that this is precisely saying that v → ∆L n v arises as a fixed point Ξ(t; ∆L n , ·) = ∆L n (·) (t), where the random map Ξ :
However, the mapping f → Ξ(t; f, ·) can have multiple fixed points, so the above fixed point constraint alone is not enough to determine the jump sizes ∆L n . That is, the system (5.5) is a priori ill-posed without a selection rule. Based on the natural step-by-step resolution of default cascades (explained in detail in Section 5.2.2 below), the correct selection rule simply amounts to a (suitably initialized) iterative application of the mapping Ξ. This can be formulated succinctly as
(5.12) which we will refer to as the cascade condition for the jump sizes. As concerns the notion of a step-by-step resolution, the number of 'steps' or 'rounds' in the cascade is given by the smallest m such that lim m→n ∆ m t,· = ∆m t,· . For clarity, further details on this are presented in the separate Section 5.2.2 below, where we give a precise mathematical definition of instantaneous default cascades leading to this condition.
Detailed description of the resolution of cascades
Let A t denote the (random) set of indices i ≤ n such that t ≤ τ i for each i ∈ A t , meaning that bank i was (and may still be) solvent-or more colloquially, 'alive'-strictly before time t. Note that there is at least one default at time t precisely when X i0 (t ) = 0 for some bank indexed by i 0 ∈ A t . Therefore, we define the (random) set of indices D 0 t as precisely those i ∈ A t for which X i (t ) = 0, corresponding to the initial set of defaults at time t (which came about without any role played by contagion).
Supposing that D 0 t = ∅, we now need to make it mathematically precise how to decide if a cascade is initiated by the contagious effects from these initial defaults-and then we need to make precise how to resolve the total size of the cascade if it occurs.
Recalling the definition of Ξ in (5.11), the isolated effect of the initial defaults (which we recall are indexed by D 0 t ) is to increase each L n vi (t ) by an initial jump of size
Next, we define the (random) set of indices
In other words, the members of D 1 t are precisely those banks that enter into default at time t on account of the contagion from the initiating set of defaults D 0 t . Supposing that D 1 t = ∅, we must update the losses to include this first round of contagion, and check if this induces another round of contagion. This amounts to considering a jump in L n vi (t ) of size
and thus defining D 2 t ⊂ A t /D 1 t as precisely those i ∈ A t /D 1 t for which
For any m ≤ n, ∆ m t,(·) and D m t are defined analogously. Recalling that n −1 k l=1 v li u jl = λ ji ≥ 0, it is always the case that ∆ m t,(·) = Ξ(t; ∆ m−1 t,(·) , ·) ≥ ∆ m−1 t, (·) in the pointwise sense. In particular, each (∆ m t,v ) is an increasing sequence in m = 0, 1, . . . , n, and it is immediate that Dm t = ∅ implies
so the sequence eventually reaches a fixed point after them'th round of contagion-induced defaults (since there are only n banks in total, note that we must have D n t = ∅). Once a fixed point is reached at them'th iteration, there are no further defaults, and hence the default cascade is fully resolved with
By construction, each sequence (∆ m t,v ) stays fixed after thism'th iteration, so the value ∆L n v (t) is indeed the limit of ∆ m t,v as m → n, in agreement with the cascade condition defined in (5.12). This formulation of the jump size as a limit of iterated steps in the default cascade is instructive for the formulation of the mean field analogue, which follows in the next subsection.
Remark 5.6. If all banks have interbank liabilities, then, for any j, there is an i such that λ ji > 0. Hence, we get D m t = ∅ if and only if Ξ(t; ∆ m t,· , v) ≥ ∆ m t,v for all v ∈ {v 1 . . . , v n } and Ξ(t; ∆ m t,· , v) > ∆ m t,v for at least one v ∈ {v 1 . . . , v n }.
The mean field limit
Provided there is a suitable averaging effect, we can send n → ∞ in the particle system (5.5) and thereby capture the 'systemic' or macro-level properties of the finite system through its mean field limit. As we show in Appendix A.3, the insistence on Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4 is sufficient to ensure such a law of large numbers, and it then follows that the resulting mean field limit is given by a McKean-Vlasov problem of the form
In general, one would expect the above problem to be continuous in time, due to the 'averaging' effect of passing to the mean field limit, and, as long as this is the case, the system is fully specified by (5.13). However, as we saw already in Section 4, the loss processes t → L l (t) may in fact undergo jump discontinuities (in particular, [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm 1.1] can be adapted to show that such jumps must occur for some parameters). When accounting for this, one needs to be careful that the jump sizes are not pinned down uniquely by the formulation (5.13). Similarly to the cascade condition for the finite system, a concrete choice must be made that allows the system to be càdlàg and uniquely determines the jumps. This is the topic of the next subsection.
Determining the jump sizes
Our first task is to show that the jump sizes must obey certain fixed point constraints. By analogy with the analysis of cascades in the finite system, we therefore define the mapping L :
where L ∞ (0, T ) = L ∞ ([0, T ], R) is the space of bounded real-valued functions on [0, T ] under the equivalence relation of being equal almost everywhere. By Assumption 5.4 and the definition of each L l , the process t → L v (t) is indeed bounded, for each v ∈ S(v), and crucially the assumptions also imply that t → L v (t) is increasing. Similarly to the constraint (5.9) for the finite system, we can infer directly from (5.13) that the jumps of each L l must satisfy
Once the jumps of L are pinned down, the constraint (5.14) uniquely determines the jumps of each loss process L l . Furthermore, from (5.14) and the definition of L, it follows that the (random) value of ∆L must be a fixed point of the (random) mapping f → Ξ(t; f, ·), where
In general, the map (5.15) can have several, even infinitely many, fixed points (for example, f ≡ 0 is always a fixed point, but this is not compatible with jumps), so ∆L is not uniquely specified a priori. This situation is resolved by the selection rule (5.16) introduced below, mimicking the cascade condition (5.12) for the jumps in the finite system. However, unlike the finite system, the mean field limit always satisfies Ξ(t; 0, ·) = 0, so the occurrence and size of a potential default cascade must be identified by artificially exposing the system to an arbitrarily small shock. Specifically, we shift the system down by a small amount Θ(t; , v) and then keep track of how the resulting losses propagate as ε ↓ 0, meaning that the size of the initial shift Θ(t; , v) vanishes. Mathematically, this means that, for v ∈ S(v), the jump size ∆L v (t) is given by the mean field cascade condition (5.16) where the equalities hold almost surely (recall that Ξ is conditional on the common noise B 0 ). We stress that the limit is well-defined, since (∆
) forms a bounded sequence that increases as m ↑ ∞ and decreases as ε ↓ 0. Moreover, dominated convergence shows that the (random) map v → ∆L v (t) given by (5.16) is a fixed point of f → Ξ(t, f, ·), so this choice for the jump sizes is indeed consistent with the McKean-Vlasov problem (5.13).
Remark 5.7. We emphasise that the iterative structure of (5.16) lends itself easily to numerical implementation, and this is indeed the starting point for the algorithm behind the simulations in Figure 3 . Moreover, we note that, in the case of a symmetric network of obligations, [Hambly et al., 2019, Proposition 2.4] gives that the mean field cascade condition (5.16) agrees with the corresponding notion of a 'physical' jump condition considered in .
A simple criterion for ruling out jumps
We now present a simple criterion, namely (5.18), that rules out a jump discontinuity at a given time t > 0 and guarantees the solution stays continuous in some small amount of time thereafter. Of course, the mean field cascade condition (5.16) already gives the precise criterion for whether or not the system undergoes a jump at time t, but our aim here is to provide some intuition for the workings of this condition. At any given time t > 0, and for any pair (u, v), we let V t (·|u, v) denote the random density of the random sub-probability measure
For the purposes of this subsection, we think of having fixed a realisation of B 0 , so the below criteria (5.18) should be understood as holding for this particular realisation: thus, the conclusion is that there is no jump for this particular realisation of B 0 . Of course, if the criteria holds for all realisations of B 0 , then it is an almost sure conclusion.
Recalling the definition of Θ, we have
where V t is the pointwise left limit of V s as s ↑ t. Now fix a time t > 0, and suppose V t and the joint distributionˆ of (u, v) satisfy the following criterion: there is a small δ > 0 such that, for each v ∈ S(v),
for some small enough v > 0. Then we get
for all ε > 0 sufficiently small such that F Lip g(t)ε < v . In turn, for all ε > 0 such that
t,· , v) ≤ (1 − δ)ε + (1 − δ) 2 ε, and, by recursion, for any given m ≥ 1 we thus have
Since 1 − δ < 1, the sum forms a geometric series that converges as m → ∞, so provided (5.18) is satisfied we conclude that
In particular, each s → L l (s) must indeed continuous at time t. In other words, after the system takes an artificial hit of order ε, the induced rounds of contagion quickly become negligible with the total effect being at most of order ε (i.e., of the same order as the initial 'artificial' shock), and so they disappear as the size of the initial shock is sent to zero. Furthermore, now that we know there is not a jump, a straightforward adaptation of [Søjmark, 2019, Prop. 6.4.3] shows that a bound of the form (5.18) holds for some small amount time, so the solution remains continuous on this nonzero time interval.
On the other hand, Remark 4.2 from Section 4 provides a simple example where the condition (5.18) is violated, for some v ∈ S(v), and where it is proved that the cascade condition must therefore result in a jump discontinuity. In addition to the argument provided there, we remind the reader of Figure 3 , which illustrates the occurrence of the jump. In this respect, let us also stress that there can of course be cases where t → L v (t) only jumps for some v ∈ S(v) and not for others, provided there are certain types which are not exposed to the types experiencing default cascades. As a particular example of this, we could amend the example behind Figure 3 by imposing that 'Core 2' is not exposed to losses in 'Core 1' and 'Periphery 2': then we obtain an example where L l jumps for l = 1, 4 ('Core 1' and 'Periphery 2') while it does not jump for l = 2, 3 ('Core 2' and 'Periphery 1').
Remark 5.8. Notice that if the Dirichlet boundary condition V t− (0|u, v) = 0 is satisfied (meaning that lim x↓0 V t− (x|u, v) = 0), then (5.18) is definitely true. More generally, the criterion amounts to y → V t (y|u, v) being sufficiently small relative to F −1 Lip g(t) −1 near y = 0, depending on the joint distributionˆ . Starting from a nice initial condition, we will have V t (0|u, v) = 0 for some amount of time, but if the contagious feedback becomes too strong it may transport the density so fast towards the origin that there is a blow-up time t : that is, the derivative of t → L(t) diverges as t ↑ t , and the left limit density V t fails to vanish at zero, in a way such that the cascade condition enforces a jump discontinuity ∆L(t ) > 0.
Idiosyncratic noise: well-posedness and regularity of the loss
In this subsection we consider the McKean-Vlasov problem (5.13) when ρ = 0, meaning that there is no common noise. This makes it more tractable to get a handle on the regularity of the loss processes. Under a mild assumption on the initial profile of the system, we are able to generalise the arguments from and thus show that the system is well-posed up until the L 2 norm of the gradient of the losses, namely (∂ t L 1 , . . . , ∂ t L k ), explodes.
The assumption on the initial profile amounts to controlling the decay of the mass near the origin. Specifically, using the notation from Assumption 5.4, we require that the initial condition
for all x > 0, (5.19) for constants C , D , x > 0 and a power β ∈ (0, 1], uniformly in u ∈ S(u) and v ∈ S(v).
Theorem 5.9 (Well-posedness up to explosion). Suppose the initial condition ν 0 satisfies (5.19) and let Assumption 5.3 be in place. Then there is a regular (i.e., differentiable) solution (L 1 . . . , L k ) to the McKean-Vlasov problem (5.13) up to the explosion time t := sup t > 0 :
with the property that, for all t < t , ∂ s L l (s) ≤ Ks −(1−β)/2 on [0, t] for some constant K > 0. Moreover, the solution is unique on [0, t ] in the broadest possible sense: any generic càdlàg solution to (5.13) satisfying the cascade condition (5.16) must agree with the regular solution on [0, t ].
Proof. See Section A.1 in the Appendix.
We do not attempt to address general results on global uniqueness here, but it is natural to conjecture that there is indeed uniqueness under the cascade condition (5.16). One would then expect to have a regularity result analogous to Theorem 5.9 holding on the intervals in between blow-ups. In the case of a symmetric network of liabilities and constant coefficients with F (x) = x and g(x) = 1, it follows from [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 2.4 ] that the McKean-Vlasov problem considered here (with only idiosyncratic noise) simplifies to that of [Hambly et al., 2019, Eqn. (1.1)] with the physical jump condition [Hambly et al., 2019, Eqn. (1.8) ] in place of the cascade condition. For this problem, global uniqueness and regularity was recently established in the preprint Delarue et al. [2019] .
Common noise: global well-posedness with weak feedback
For a given initial profile ν 0 and feedback functions F and g, we already argued above that solutions to the conditional McKean-Vlasov problem (5.13) exist, by virtue of arising as limit points of the finite particle system (5.5), provided Assumptions 5.4 and 5.3 are satisfied. For the details of this, we refer to Section A.3 in the appendix.
Existence aside, general results on global as well as local uniqueness remain a challenge in the presence of the common noise, even for simpler versions of the problem. Nevertheless, we have the following result when a 'smallness condition ', namely (5.20) , is imposed on the feedback functions F and g in relation to the initial profile of the system. This condition guarantees that the feedback from contagion is too weak to generate blow-ups in the mean field limit, independently of the different realisations of the common noise.
Theorem 5.10 (Global well-posedness in the weak feedback regime). Let Assumption 5.3 be in place. If there is a δ > 0 such that (5.20) for all v ∈ S(v), then there is a globally unique solution to (5.13), and this solution is continuous in time.
Proof. See Section A.2 of the Appendix.
The smallness condition (5.20) should look familiar in light of Section 5.3.2, and indeed the proof of continuity in time amounts to verifying that the smallness condition implies the bound (5.18). On the other hand, by adapting the arguments from [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Theorem 2.7] , one can show that: if the smallness condition (5.20) does not hold, then there is a non-trivial probability of seeing jump discontinuities (for certain realisations of the common noise). We make no attempt at treating uniqueness in that regime here.
The core-periphery model from Section 4
In this final section we show how the core-periphery mean field model (4.10) from Section 4 is a special case of the mean field limit (5.13). Following the framework of Section 5.3.5, given m 0 = m c + m p , we write n = mm 0 for arbitrary multiples m ≥ 1, and let the liabilities matrix λ n×n be defined by (4.4)-(4.5) via the underlying matrixλ m0×m0 . Due to the special structure, we have the decomposition
given the entriesû ij andv ij of the underlying rank decomposition
Now consider the concrete choice (4.3) forλ m0×m0 , and notice that the four types (two core banks and two peripheral groups) means that its decomposition is fully described by just four row vectors ofÛ m0×k and four column vectors ofV k×m0 : namely the two 'core' pairs (ũ 1 ,ṽ 1 ) := (û 1 ,v 1 ) and (ũ 2 ,ṽ 2 ) := (û 2 ,v 2 ) (5.21)
as well as the two 'peripheral' pairs
As we grow the system to arbitrarily large sizes n = mm 0 , according to (4.4), this underlying structure from the rank decomposition ofλ is preserved. Thus, the empirical measures (5.4) corresponding to the decompositions nλ n×n = mm 0 λ mm0×mm0 = U mm0×k V k×mm0 take the form
for a general n = mm 0 , for all m ≥ 1. Since all the ( , δ)'s are drawn from P ⊗ P in an i.i.d. way, it follows that n is weakly convergent with limiting law (5.24) for i = 1, . . . , 4, given the four (fixed and deterministic) principal pairs (ũ i ,ṽ i ) ∈ R k × R k from (5.21)-(5.22). It remains to observe that, for each i, j = 1 . . . , 4, the mutual exposures
are precisely those ofλ 4×4 in (4.11). Writing τ x l,θ = τ x φ l (θ) and X x l,θ = X x φ l (θ) , it therefore follows from (5.23)-(5.24) and (5.25) that the general formulation of the mean field limit (5.13) simplifies to that of (4.10) from Section 4, as desired.
Conclusion
In this work we introduced the first combined model that considers an Eisenberg-Noe style framework for interbank contagion which can be recast as an interacting particle system with a well-defined mean field limit. Therefore, we are able to draw a direct connection between these previously disparate frameworks for systemic risk, focusing either on the resolution of default cascades in finite bank networks or stochastic dynamics with simple mean field interactions.
The proposed contagion mechanism considers banks with stochastic external assets which, if they drop, can cause defaults before the maturity of all claims. This is handled first for a finite number of institutions in a purely Eisenberg-Noe style framework, thus extending Banerjee et al. [2018] to account for early defaults. Next, we demonstrate a limiting behaviour as the number of banks increase, which provides justification for performing the analysis of contagion at the level of the mean field limit. In this way, one can significantly lower the parameter space, and it becomes more tractable to pursue analytical results for the regularity of the system's evolution in time. Moreover, one can circumvent the curse of dimensionality and avoid the slow convergence of Monte Carlo based methods, for example by implementing an analogue of the numerical scheme from Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] as we did in Figure 3 (alternatively, one could attempt to adapt the semi-analytical approach of Kaushansky et al. [2018c] ). As regards the antecedent mean field literature, we provide a more convincing financial underpinning for , , Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] , Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019a,b] , while also extending the analytical results of , Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b] to allow for heterogeneous interactions and a more general form of contagion. Furthermore, we add to Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] by introducing the cascade condition for the resolution of instantaneous default cascades (i.e., jump sizes) as well as establishing results on convergence and uniqueness.
The model of default cascades presented herein can be utilized to answer many questions in systemic risk that are typically intractable analytically (as well as computationally inefficient) for finite bank networks. Additionally, the mean field limit allows for a cleaner analysis of key 'systemic' quantities, as exemplified by the mean field cascade condition that gives a precise characterisation of default cascades with an instantaneous 'systemic' impact. One important new strand of literature is that of network valuation adjustments Barucca et al. [2016] , Banerjee and Feinstein [2019] , in which prices of securities should account for the full network effects. In this regard, the stochastic dynamics underlying the framework herein makes it well-suited for, e.g., pricing credit default swaps on the financial system. By further utilizing the mean field limit, the lower parameter space can facilitate calibration of the stochastic dynamics, and this also opens up the possibility of relying on more analytical methods. These problems are intimately related with systemic risk measures. For instance, the value-at-risk or CoVaR Adrian and Brunnermeier [2016] of the financial system are related to mappings such as a → P(L(t) > a) and (a, δ) → P L(t + δ) − L(t) > a , for a given time t. More specifically, an interesting modification of CoVaR in the mean field limit for core-periphery systems, as discussed in Section 4, is for consideration of the health of the aggregate system conditional on the stress of one of the "groups" of institutions. In fact, such structures may allow for the tractable consideration of general systemic risk measures of Chen et al. [2013] , Feinstein et al. [2017] , Biagini et al. [2019b] as well. Additionally, rather than applying these network valuation adjustments for measuring systemic risk in exogenously provided network structures, the pricing of risk in such a way may allow for considerations of endogenous network formation. In such a setting, each financial institution would choose to invest in external projects or engage in interbank markets so as to solve some portfolio optimization problem. Only with a consideration of credit pricing in a financial network would such endogenous network formation be tractable, and we believe this points towards an important avenue of future research.
Proof. Fix t < t 0 . Recalling that v (0) = 0, integration by parts (see e.g., [Stroock, 2011, Sect. 1 
and likewise for¯ v . Using this and the assumptions on F , g, , and¯ , we have
Thus, taking the difference between the two processes X x, u,v and X x,¯ u,v , as defined in (A.2) coupled through the same Brownian motion, it follows that
Therefore, using the continuity of v , for any s ∈ [0, t], it holds on the event {τ x, u,v = s} that
Based on this, we can replicate the arguments from [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 3 .1], by instead conditioning on the value of τ x, u,v and using the previous inequality, to deduce that
Performing a time change in the Brownian integral, and using that there is a uniform > 0 such that ≤ σ u,v ≤ −1 , by Assumption 5.3, it follows from the law of the infimum of a Brownian motion that
where the constant C > 0 is independent of t, x, u, and v. Now fix anyṽ ∈ S(v). Multiplying both sides of the above inequality by k l=1ṽ l u l and recalling that this is non-negative for all u in the support of , by Assumption 5.4, we can then integrate both sides of the resulting inequality against , over (x, u, v 
for all t < t 0 , for some fixed numerical constant C > 0 independent of t 0 andṽ. As the right-hand side is positive, this proves the lemma.
For any γ ∈ (0, 1/2), A > 0, and t > 0, we define the space S(γ, A, t) ⊂ C * t by
which is a complete metric space with the metric inherited from C * t . Moreover, we define the mapΓ u, v) . Then, for each u and v, we can replicate the arguments from [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 4] for the function t →Γ[ ; u, v](t) in place of the corresponding function considered there. Givenˆ and V 0 (·|u, v) satisfying (5.19), we can thus conclude (by arguing precisely as in [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 4.9] ), that there exists A > 0 such that, for any ε 0 > 0, there is a small enough time t 0 > 0 for which
where A only depends on C and x from (5.19). Moreover, by analogy with [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1 .6], we can deduce from Lemma A.1 that Γ is a contraction on this space for small enough t 0 . Therefore, the small time existence of a regular solution L * v (t) = k l=1 v l L l (t) to (5.13, ρ = 0) now follows from an application of Banach's fixed point theorem as in the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.7] . Finally, by replicating the bootstrapping argument from the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Cor. 5 .3], we conclude that the regular solution extends until the first time t such that the H 1 norm of (L 1 , . . . , L k ) diverges on (0, t ). This proves the first part of Theorem 5.9.
A.1.2 Generic uniqueness
It remains to verify that the general uniqueness result of [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.8] can be extended to the present setting, which will follow from the two lemmas below. The first lemma concerns a family of auxiliary McKean-Vlasov problems given by x,û,v) . This family of equations will serve as the equivalent of the 'ε-deleted solutions' introduced in [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 5.2] . By writing
we can show that these ε-deleted problems are well-posed with regularity estimates that are uniform in ε > 0.
Lemma A.2 (Uniformly regular ε-deleted solutions). There is an ε 0 > 0 such that (A.5) has a family of solutions {L ε } ε≤ε0 which are uniformly regular in the following sense: There exists
Proof. First of all, we can note that λ ε v ≤ C ε 1+β /(1+β) uniformly in v, for small enough ε > 0, by (5.19), and clearly F (x) = o(x 1/(1+β) ) as x ↓ 0, since F is Lipschitz with F (0) = 0. Hence there exists ε 0 > 0 such that F (g(0)λ ε v ) ≤ ε/4 for all ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ). Next, using (A.6) and making the change of variables y = x − ε/4 − F (g(0)λ ε v ) in (A.5) we obtain the equivalent formulation
≤ (y + ε/2) β 1 y≥ε/2 ≤ 2 β C y β for all y < x /2, uniformly in u, v, and ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ). Therefore, for each ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ), we can indeed construct a regular solutionL ε to the above system by the first part of Theorem 5.9 (as proved in Section A.1.1). Moreover, since the boundary control on V ε 0 (·|u, v) is uniform in ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ), uniformly in u and v, it follows from the fixed point argument in Section A.1.1 that the regularity of the solutionsL ε is also uniform in ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ). By (A.6), the uniform regularity of the original family L ε follows a fortiori from that ofL ε , and thus the proof is complete.
Armed with Lemma A.2, we can now proceed to the final ingredient of the general uniqueness result, namely the 'monotonicity and trapping' argument from [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 5.2] .
Lemma A.3 (Monotonicity and vanishing envelope). Let L * : S(v) → L ∞ (0, T ) be given by
for a generic solution to (5.13) with ρ = 0, and suppose there are no jumps of (L 1 , . . . ,
Moreover, if L is regular on [0, t 0 ) and the family {L ε } is uniformly regular on [0, t 0 ), in the sense of Lemma A.2, then there is a t 1 ∈ (0, t 0 ) such that the envelope between the two is vanishing on
Then it holds for any s < t that
and, since F is increasing, we thus have
for all s ∈ (0, t). Arguing as in the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Lemma 5.6] , it follows from (A.7) that
which contradicts the definition of t, thus proving the first claim. For the second claim, can now rely on the fact that L ε v > L v on [0, t 0 ) for all v = 0. Consequently, since X x,ε u,v (s) = 0 on the event {τ x,ε u,v = s}, we deduce that, on this event,
where the inequality follows by the equality in (A.7) and the same estimate as in the proof of Lemma A.1. From here, (A.8) allows us to replicate the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Lemma 5.7] , only with the term 'g(0) F Lip L ε − L * s ' in place of the term 'α(L ε s − L s )' appearing in that proof. This verifies the second claim.
Based on Lemmas A.1 and A.3, the uniqueness part of Theorem 5.9 now follows immediately by retracing the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.8] (at the very end of [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 5] ) with the cascade condition (5.16) taking the place of the physical jump condition , (1.7) ].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.10
Let us begin by proving the continuity of a given solution satisfying the smallness condition (5.20). To this end, we fix a pair (u, v) and write X
Letting p(t, ·) denote the density of Y (t), it follows from Tonelli's theorem that
for all A ∈ B(R), since p(t, ·) integrates to 1. Recalling the definition of V t from (5.17), this shows that V t (x|u, v) ≤ V 0 (·|u, v) ∞ for all x ∈ (0, ∞) and all times t ≥ 0. Therefore, the criterion (5.18) holds for all times, by the smallness condition (5.20), and hence the given solution must be globally continuous in time.
To prove the uniqueness part of Theorem 5.10, we show how to extend the arguments behind [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Thm. 2.3] . Let (X, L) and (X,L) be any two solutions to (5.13) coupled through the same Brownian drivers B and B 0 . Then we define the increasing processes
Retracing the arguments of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b , Lemma 2.1], and applying Fubini's theorem, we can deduce that By symmetry,L v (s) − L v (s) satisfies the analogous bound with I v (s) andĪ v (s) interchanged. Furthermore, by simply repeating the first estimate from the proof of Lemma A.1, only with L andL in place of and¯ , we have
Therefore, relying on this inequality together with the previous observation, we can retrace the arguments of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Theorem 2.2] and conclude that
At this point, the smallness condition (5.20) gives
so, taking a supremum over v ∈ S(v) on the left-hand side, we conclude that there is pathwise uniqueness.
A.3 Convergence of the particle system
In this section we outline how the convergence to the conditional McKean-Vlasov problem (5.13) can be established by retracing the approach of Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] after some adjustments. The arguments rely heavily on specific properties of the M1-topology for the Skorokhod space of càdlàg paths. The reader is referred to Whitt [2002] for an introduction to this topology. For concreteness, let us restrict to random start points X i 0 satisfying (5.19) near the absorbing boundary at zero, although it is possible to consider higher generality in these arguments.
Let D R denote the space of real-valued càdlàg paths on [0, T ], and let (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be the unique strong solution to the particle system (5.5) of size n in D R × · · · × D R (recall Proposition 5.5). Moreover, as usual, we let u i ∈ R k and v i ∈ R k denote the type vectors from (5.4), for i = 1, . . . , n. For simplicity of notation, we are suppressing the dependence on n ≥ 1 in each triple (u i , v i , X i ) ∈ R k × R k × D R . Now consider the empirical measures P n := 1 n n i=1 δ ui ⊗ δ vi ⊗ δ Xi(·) , for n ≥ 1, (A.9)
which are random variables valued in the space of probability measures P(R k × R k × D R ). For (u, v, η) ∈ R k ×R k ×D R , we define the coordinate projections π 1,l (u, v, η) := u l , π 2,l (u, v, η) := v l , and π 3,t (u, v, η) := η t as well as π t (u, v, η) := (u, v, η t ) and π (1,2) (u, v, η) := (u, v). Writing P n t := P n • π −1 t andˆ n := P n • π −1 (1,2) , we have P n 0 = n ⇒ andˆ n →ˆ by virtue of Assumption 5.4. The first task is to ensure tightness of the pair (P n , B 0 ) so that we can extract weakly convergent subsequences.
Lemma A.4 (Tightness). The sequence of random variables (P n , B 0 ) is tight on the product space P(R k × R k × D R ) × C R . Here C R is the space of continuous real-valued paths on [0, T ] topologized by uniform convergence, and P(R k × R k × D R ) is topologized by weak convergence of measures as induced by the M1-topology on D R .
Proof. Since D R is a Polish space with the M1-topology, it is a classical result (see e.g. [Sznitman, 1991, Ch.I, Prop. 2.2] ) that the sequence of (random) empirical measures P n is tight if, for each ε > 0, we can find K ε compact in R k × R k × D R , where D R comes with the M1-topology, such that, for all n ≥ 1,
To fulfil this, it is sufficient that, for every ε > 0, we can find a compact set K ε such that P((u i , v i , X i ) ∈ K ε ) ≥ 1 − ε for each i = 1, . . . , n uniformly in n ≥ 1. By Assumption 5.4, we have |u i | + |v i | ≤ C, for some C > 0, uniformly in i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. Hence we can take K ε to be of the form K ε =B C × S ε , whereB C is the closed ball of radius C in R 2k , and S ε is compact in (D R , M1). Consequently, writing X n i for the i'th particle in the size-n particle system, it suffices to show that each sequence (X n i ) n≥1 is tight with estimates that are uniform in i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. To this end, the first crucial observation is that
is increasing. Therefore, exploiting the special nature of the M1-topology, the uniform tightness estimates can be established by retracing the steps of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.9] .
We now turn to the problem of identifying the limit points of (P n , B 0 ) as n → ∞, where convergent subsequences are ensured by Prokhorov's theorem in light of the previous lemma. First of all, we define the mapping (L l (µ))(t) := µ, π 1,l (·)1 (∞,0] inf s≤t π 3,t (·) , (A.10) for µ ∈ P(R k × R k × D R ), where the rationale is of course that (L l (P n ))(t) = 1 n n j=1 u jl 1 t≥τj = L n l (t).
(A.11)
Using the mappings µ → L l (µ), we in turn define and we then intend to perform a martingale argument to identify the limit points of (P n , B 0 ) based on mappings of the form where the right-hand side is a nice average of the function Ψ applied to square integrable martingales on [0, T ]. This will essentially allow us to transfer suitable martingale properties to the limit as n → ∞, which is the machinery behind the next observations. Proceeding as in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Lemma 3 .11] we can show that (A.13) and similar mappings are continuous for suitable functions Ψ (the specific mappings are defined immediately before [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Lemma 3.11] ). Fix a limit point (P, B 0 ) of (P n , B 0 ), realised along a convergent subsequence (due to Lemma A.4 above). Write = Law(u, v, X(0)), where we recall that = P 0 is the limit of n = P n 0 , as ensured by Assumption (5.4). Retracing the steps of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.12] and [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Proof of Thm. 3.2, p. 26] , based on the aforementioned continuity results, we can show that there is a probability space (Ω,F,P) which supports our limiting random variables (u, v, P, B 0 ) and also carries a càdlàg process X as well as a Brownian motion B ⊥ B 0 , for which (B, B 0 ) is independent of (u, v, X(0)), such that (M(u, v, X, P))(t) = To avoid clouding the presentation, let us (for now) assume that the limiting random probability measure P is known to be B 0 measurable. Intuitively, this is what one expects, as the sequence P n is subject to the common noise B 0 , which is felt by all the particles, and hence should stay in the limit; whereas the effect of the idiosyncratic noise from the independent Brownian motions B 1 , . . . , B n will be averaged way in the limit. The situation where P is not known to be B 0 -measurable is dealt with separately in Remark A.5 below. Once we have that P is B 0 -measurable, retracing the proof of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Thm. 3 .2], as we did above, not only gives (A.14), but also shows that P = Law(u, v, X | B 0 ). Therefore, lettingĒ denote the expectation operator corresponding toP, we have (L l (P))(t) = P, π 1,l (·)1 (∞,0] inf s≤t π 3,t (·)
Since (u, v, X(0)) is independent of (B, B 0 ), using the equation for X in (A.14) and the definition of L in (A.10), we can conclude from (A.15) that (L l (P))(t) = for all realisations (u, v) of (u, v). Consequently, we have recovered the desired mean field limit (5.13), since the limit point (P, B 0 ) of (P n , B 0 ) satisfies the conditional McKean-Vlasov problem (A.16)-(A.17). Furthermore, as in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.6 ] and the proof of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3 .9], the above tightness and continuity results, along with the expression (A.11), give that (in the M1 topology on D R ), the loss processes L n l = L l (P n ) converge to the desired limiting loss processes L l = L l (P) satisfying the conditional McKean-Vlasov problem (A.16)-(A.17).
Remark A.5. Without assuming B 0 -measurability, we need to work with what is defined as a 'relaxed' solution to (5.13) in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Sect. 3] . Specifically, the arguments from Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] only gives that P = Law(u, v, X | B 0 , P) with (B 0 , P) ⊥ B and (B, (B 0 , P)) ⊥ X(0), as opposed to P = Law(u, v, X | B 0 ) which we relied on above. That is, P fulfils the first criteria for being the conditional law of (u, v, X) given B 0 , but it is only known to be (B 0 , P)-measurable, and hence it may not be the true conditional law given B 0 . Yet, it behaves in almost the same way, since it is also independent of B, which is precisely what we expected to happen in the limit, as the idiosyncratic noise is averaged away and the common noise B 0 is independent of B. Repeating (A.15) with (P, B 0 ) in place of B 0 , and using that (u, v, X(0)) is independent of (B, (B 0 , P)), we instead get (L l (P))(t) =
so there is potentially some extra randomness that has survived the limiting procedure. In other words, we have mildly relaxed the criterion that the loss processes should strictly be conditional on the common noise B 0 . For this reason, the limit thus obtained is called a 'relaxed' solution to (5.13). Nevertheless, in cases where we have a pathwise uniqueness argument for (5.13) such as in Section A.2 (the proof of Theorem 5.10), we can apply a Yamada-Watanabe argument as in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Thm. 2.3 ] to ensure that P really is B 0 measurable and that we are hence only conditioning on the common noise B 0 .
